In this paper, a regulatory framework is developed to motivate investors for involving in distributed generation (DG) 
INTRODUCTION
Although the power system deregulation has paved the way for establishment of competitive markets in some segments (e.g. generation, wholesale and retailing etc.), electricity distribution companies (Discos) are still under regulation owing to their natural monopoly characteristic [1] . Generally, in monopoly environments, there is not sufficient motivation for companies to employ new technologies to improve their economic efficiency and service quality unless an acceptable rate of return is set by the regulator to recover such investments. These conditions becomes worse in the presence of performance based regulation (PBR) [2] . In response, electricity distribution regulators have tried to provide some financial incentives aimed at inducing Discos to adopt new technologies. In this way, regulators in many countries have set different incentive-based mechanisms in order to motivate Discos to install various technologies of distributed generation (DG) resources in the networks. In [3] , a review is done about these supporting regulations. In brief, the main idea behind these regulations is to guarantee an acceptable level of profit for the DG investors. However, such regulations are incapable of optimally determining the supporting policies in such a way that different technical factors of distribution systems would be improved [4] . In other words, under these supporting regulations the development of DG resources can have unpredictable (i.e. positive or negative) effects on the performance of the distribution networks. Two major regulatory tools which can be employed to cope with this problem are the economic regulation of Discos and network tariffs for grid users [5] . In this paper, the first method of interest, since the main idea behind our proposed method is to design indirect financial incentives based on the performance measures that can be improved by the efficient integration of DG resources. Hence, such regulations motivate Discos to not only increase the penetration of DGs but also efficiently integrate them to improve the performance measures of their networks. To this end, we will take the advantage of the reward-penalty scheme (RPS). This is because distribution system regulators in many countries accept the RPS as an effective tool for regulating the service quality [6] . A variety of methods for designing the RPS are developed in many publications. In [7] and [8] , methods based on the Fuzzy C-means clustering (FCM) are proposed to design the RPS aimed at establishing kind of competition among similar Discos to improve service reliability. Authors in [9] , proposed a designing method to equalize the total rewards and penalties arising from implementation of RPS in order to reduce the regulatory cost. Investigation of the impact of economic and quality regulations of distribution system on integration of DGs is also considered in many publications in this field. In [10] , a method has been proposed to calculate the incentives for Discos to integrate DG into their grid. In [11] , economic regulations of Discos in Spain and Portugal have been reviewed and after the identification of gaps in the regulatory tools and methodologies, some special improvements have been proposed. The analysis of traditional distribution system regulation and how to improve them to accommodate higher levels of DG have carried out in [12] . The state-of-art of the regulatory frameworks for integration of DG in some EU government has reviewed in [13] . However, to the best of authors' knowledge, the incentives for DG integration have not been considered in the designing procedure of the RPS. Hence, the main contribution of this paper is to propose a method to design the RPS aimed at motivating Discos to efficiently employ DG resources in a manner that improves the reliability and reduces energy losses in distribution network.
REWARD-PENALTY SCHEME
The RPS is a regulatory tool that creates a link between a quality index (e.g. reliability indices) and companies' revenue [14] . In this scheme, at first, regulators define the acceptable level of the quality index as a target value or benchmark. Then, companies which fail to satisfy this target will be penalized. On the other hand, companies whose performance are better than the target will receive bonus. A general form of the RPS is depicted in fig. 1 [15] . This graph shows the relation between the value of the quality index and the amount of reward or penalty. As shown in fig. 1 , the main parameters of the RPS graph are benchmark, dead band width, incentive rate, reward cap, and penalty cap. The dead band is a zone around the benchmark that neither penalty nor reward is exposed. Beyond this zone a Disco receives bonus or incurs penalty depends on the value of its quality index [15] . It should be noted that the smaller value of most of indices which are used in the RPS (e.g. reliability indices, and energy losses) corresponds to the better performance. Consequently, in fig. 1 , the direction of improvement in the quality index is assumed to be right-to-left. The slope of the line between the reward and the reward cap points is known as reward ramp. This parameter indicates the amount of change in the value of reward per unit change in the quality index. Similarly, the slope of the line between penalty and penalty cap points is named penalty ramp [8] . The reward ramp and penalty ramp are usually taken equal and known as incentive rate (IR) [6] . Also, the value of reward or penalty is capped at a specific level in order to limit the financial risks associated with the RPS [8] . Hence, to design a RPS the values of the main parameters (e.g. benchmark, dead band width, IR, reward and penalty caps) should be determined. Although the main idea behind the RPS is quite simple, there are lots of difficulties in designing and implementing a proper and fair RPS [14] . In the next section, the designing process of RPS will be explained in detail.
PROPOSED INCENTIVE SCHEME
In this section, a method is proposed to design RPSs in a way that provides effective incentives for Discos to efficiently integrate DGs in their networks. Accordingly, general structure of the regulatory process associated to the RPS is shown in fig. 2 . As illustrated, the first step of the process is to choose the suitable quality index (indices) considering the available data and regulatory goals. Then, based on each selected quality index, a RPS will be designed. As the RPSs are designed, they are applied to the Discos for a specific period of time (e.g., one year). Then the regulatory agency evaluates the outcomes and, if it would be necessary, modifies the RPSs for the next period. In this paper, we emphasize on the designing process. Hence, the detailed information about the selection of indices and designing the RPSs are presented in the following.
Selection of the Quality Indices
As previously mentioned, the selected indices should satisfy the terms mentioned below:
1-Sufficient data should be available to calculate them.
2-Effectively reflect the regulatory goals.
As discussed earlier, the main purpose of the proposed method is to motivate Discos to efficiently employ DGs. Therefore, the selected indices should reflect the major benefits of DG resources for distribution network. Among the wide variety of benefits of DGs, we will consider ones affecting distribution system reliability and energy losses. However, the method is comprehensive and can be applied to the other aspects of DG benefits as well.
In order to quantify the reliability level of a distribution network, the reliability indices are used. The reliability indices can be divided into two main categories: load point indices and system indices [16] . Load point indices illustrate the reliability level at an individual load point and the system indices show the reliability level of the whole network. The RPSs are usually applied to the average system reliability indices e.g. system average interruption duration index (SAIDI), system average interruption frequency index (SAIFI) and average energy not supplied (AENS) [3] , [14] .
Major effect of DGs on distribution system reliability is to supply a portion of loads while an interruption occurs due to a problem in distribution network or bulk power system. Hence, on the basis of these remarks, in this paper, the main benefits of DGs are considered as follows: 1-Supplying some distribution loads when upstream network is interrupted.
2-Improving the average system reliability indices.
3-Reducing the energy losses in distribution network.
In order to quantify the above items, a set of appropriate indices should be used. Then, a proper RPS should be designed based on each index. Detailed information about these indices and designing method for each RPS is described in the following.
Scheme 1: upstream network interruption
Since Discos are not responsible for the interruptions due to bulk power system (i.e. generation and transmission) outages, it is not fair to penalize them [15] . Hence, in this paper an incentive scheme (see fig. 3 ) that only contains a reward zone is proposed. The index of this scheme is defined as the amount of load served by DGs when the upstream network is unavailable. As shown in fig. 3 , the proposed scheme has two main parameters: incentive rate and reward cap. The value of reward cap is usually considered as percentage of the DISCO's annual revenue [6] .
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Also the incentive rate can be determined using (1):
IR is the incentive rate of scheme 1,  is correction coefficient and has a value between 0 and 1, IC is interruption cost, and EP is electricity price.
The purpose of  is to realize the value of interruption cost and also provide a control to share the profits of this scheme between customers and Disco. As extreme examples, if the value of  equals 0 or 1, the total profits of scheme 1 will be contributed to customers or Disco, respectively.
Scheme 2: average system reliability index
As previously mentioned, the most popular average system reliability indices which are used in RPSs are SAIFI, SAIDI and AENS. In general, the RPS diagram of this scheme is similar to fig. 1 . The benchmark value is determined based on the historic reliability data [15] . Then the dead zone width is considered as a percentage of the benchmark (usually 3 to 5 percent). The IR is calculated based on the interruption cost survey and also the reward and penalty caps are considered to be a percentage of Disco's annual revenue [7] .
Scheme 3: energy losses in distribution network
The index of this scheme is the total annual energy loss of the distribution grid. The RPS graph of this scheme is similar to fig. 1 . It is worth noting that such scheme is implemented in Portugal [10] . The benchmark value can be determined from (2).
B is the benchmark for scheme 3, Lr is the target value of loss percentage, Load is the total annual load of the previous year, and β is the annual load growth. The Lr is determined based on the improvement in the historic loss percentage. As an example, in Iran the Lr is calculated using Table 1 [17]. Where, La is the actual loss percent of the previous year and E is the expected percent of annual reduction in loss. Also, the dead band width is considered to be a percentage of the benchmark value. La  La≤10  10≤La≤12  12≤La≤14  14≤La≤16  16≤La≤18  18≤La≤20  20≤La≤22  22≤La≤24  24≤La   E  0  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  10  Lr  8 Lr=La×(1-E/100) The IR is determined based on the average annual dayahead market prices [10] . Finally, the reward and penalty caps are considered as percentages of the total annual revenue of Disco.
In the following section, the application of the proposed RPSs on the incentives for efficient integration of DGs in a test distribution network is presented.
CASE STUDY
In order to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive scheme, a case study is presented in this section. In this study, effects of the designed RPSs on the incentives for DG integration in distribution network are evaluated. The study is conducted on the test distribution network connected to bus 6 of the RBTS. This network has 4 feeders and 40 load points which supply variety of load types (e.g. residential, agricultural, and small industrial) [18] . Detailed information and data associated with this system can be found in [18] . In the following, designing process of the proposed RPSs is carried out, then the annual revenue of the test Disco affected by these schemes is analyzed.
Designing the RPSs
As previously described, three RPSs are considered in the proposed method. In order to design each RPS the main
4/5 aforementioned parameters should be found. In this regard, the maximum value of total reward and penalty (i.e. the sum of the three schemes' caps) is assumed to be 3% of annual Disco's revenue. The reward and penalty caps for each scheme are considered as a percent of the total cap according to Table 2 . The values of other parameters are listed in Table 3 . In order to calculate these parameters, the values of DG energy price, network energy price, average load and number of customers are set at 715 Rial, 409.5 Rial, 10.72 MW, and 2938, respectively.
Base Case Condition
The values of the selected indices for the base network (i.e. without DG) and also the quantity of reward or penalty from each scheme are presented in table 4. As shown in this table, in the base case condition all schemes (except scheme 1) are in the penalty zone. In the following section the effects of DGs on these schemes are considered. 
Evaluation of the Disco's revenue considering DG integration
Since DGs can improve the reliability indices and reduce the energy losses in distribution network, they can shift the selected indices to the reward zone. In order to investigate the effects of DGs on the annual Disco's revenue, we consider the optimization problem (3)-(6) subject to power flow equations and line limit constraint.
In the other words, this problem can be seen as an optimal DG placement and sizing from the Disco's viewpoint. In this problem, it is assumed that the Disco is DG investor. However, this assumption does not limit our case study and in case that Disco is not allowed to own By solving this problem using genetic algorithm (GA), the optimal location of DGs for different penetration level (i.e. DG total capacity/average load ratio) is obtained. The quantities of annual profit as a function of DG penetration are illustrated in fig. 4 . As can be seen, the annual profit for low penetration levels (0 and 4) is negative due to the penalties incurred from the RPSs. However, as the penetration level increases the penalties decreases and for the penetration levels greater than 8% the annual profit is positive. Also, annual profit starts to decrease for penetration levels between 28 to 64% and again decreases after a local maximum in 68%.
In order to investigate the effect of each scheme on the annual profit function, different components of the profit function are shown in fig. 5 . As we can see from this figure, the profits from Scheme 1 and Scheme 3 monotonically increase as the penetration level increases and reach the maximum value at 20 and 24%, respectively. Also, the profit of Scheme 2 increases until 32% and is negative in this interval, which means that the AENS is in the penalty zone of Scheme 2 and gradually moves toward the dead zone. AENS index is in the dead zone for the penetration levels between 32 to 56%, since in this interval the profit from Scheme 2 is zero. Then, for the penetration levels greater than 60% the Disco gains reward from Scheme 2. Thus, it can be concluded that the reduction in the profit from 28 to 64% of DG penetration level caused by the dead zone of scheme 2 and reward cap of schemes 1 and 3. Moreover, as shown in fig. 6 , when the AENS is in the dead zone, the rate of improvement is decreased. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, the concept of reward-penalty scheme is employed to develop a regulatory framework which motivates Discos to efficiently integrate DG units in their networks in a way that improves their networks' performance. To this end, network reliability and energy losses are considered as the main performance measures affected by DGs. Hence, some RPSs are designed based on these measures to provide economic incentives for Discos to satisfy predetermined regulatory goal of performance improvement. Finally, a case study is performed on a test distribution network to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed regulatory framework. Results show that the proposed method is capable of inducing Discos to efficiently employ DG units to improve the performance measures of their network. 
